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Introduction 
In this paper we shall be concerned to examine 
the legal position of the company secretary, with 
regard to his functions, duties, powers and liabilities . 
By duties we mean those things which he is required 
'by law to do . For example, under the Companies Act 19 55 
pursuant toss. 231 and 349, he is required to sign 
the statement of the company's affairs, and if he 
fails to do so he will be liable to the sanctions 
imposed by the Act . Duty is thus clearly related to 
liability. Then there are his functions, by which we 
mean acts that he can do, e.g. make a statutory 
declaration pursuant toss. 29 or 117. Here again 
there is overlapping, for a function is also a form 
of power. Because of this overlapping between duty 
and liability in the one case and function and power 
in the other, the proposed division into four rather 
than two separate categories is not entirely accurate. 
However, for the purposes of exposition in this paper, 
it will ·be convenient to ignore the inaccuracy and 
treat them as divisible into the four categories 
proposed. 
Development of the secretary's position 
We shall note the narrow and unrealistic view 
of the status of the secretary's position which from 
early times was adopted by the courts, and which 
narrow view was paralleled, but to a less extent, 
by the legislature. We shall contrast that with 
the wider, more realistic view taken by the business 
world. We shall note the growth in the volu~e and 
importance of the work undertaken by the secretary, 
the gradual recognition of his importance by the 
legislature, and finally a broadening of the attitude 
of the courts themselves. We shall consider whether 
the current legislative and judicial views accord 
with the reality of the situation as evidenced by the 
practice of the commercial world. 
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Managerial functions 
A company is an artificial creation, brought into 
existence for the purpose of carrying on those activities 
which are necessary for the attainment of its objects 
as they are set out in its memorandum and articles of 
association. It is the pursuit of these which is the 
real ·business of the company and the one which involves 
the skills of management. These skills are exercised 
by the managers of the company who primarily are the 
board of directors ·but who in practice will delegate 
their managerial functions to a managing director. 
Ministerial and administrative functions 
The total functioning of the enterprise involves 
however more than those activities which are aimed 
exclusively at the attainment of the company's listed 
objects. It also involves a great deal of incidental 
work which, although not concerned with the objects 
in the narrow sense, is nevertheless essential to the 
welfare of the company. This incidental work can be 
classified as the administrative and ministerial 
functions and duties pertaining to the business operation, 
and relates to the internal and domestic housekeeping 
aspects of the company's activities. Because these 
activities are not directly concerned with the attainment 
of the objects, they are not strictly managerial and do 
not call for the exercise of the skills of management. 
Indeed, should such activities be undertaken by the 
manager, they would occupy valuable management time and 
thus detract from the overall efficiency of the enterprise. 
Overall efficiency therefore requires that these duties 
be delegated. In practice that is what has happened, 
the work ·being traditionally delegated to another, 
usually a servant of the company, known as a secretary, 
although sometimes an outside professional will be 
employed. Thus relieved of the non-managerial work, the 
manager is left free to concentrate on the true tasks of 
management. Similarly, by being allocated this work on 
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an exclusive and full-time ·basis, the secretary will 
acquire a high degree of skill, with the result 
that these duties and functions will be carried out 
more efficiently. Thus the advantage of a secretary 
to the company is two-fold - it frees the manager 
from calls on his time in the non-managerial area, 
and at the same time ensures that the company is 
well served in its housekeeping activities. 
Areas of the secretary's operations 
The duties and functions of the secretary, as 
well as ms related powers and liabilities, may be 
looked at under three broad heads - those which are 
exercised pursuant to statute, those exercised within 
the company, and those exercised towards outsiders. 
Statutory duties and functions 
The best known of the duties and functions of 
the company secretary are those which he performs 
as a consequence of the requirements of the Companies 
Act 1955. It will have been under this or an 
earlier Act that the company will have ·been originally 
created and it will be pursuant to this Act that the 
company will continue to operate. The act of 
creation and that of ensuring the company's continued 
existence involve a considerable amount of clerical 
work. For example, its original incorporation will 
have involved the preparation of documents and their 
stamping and filing. Similarly its continued existence 
as a company operating within the law will require 
the keeping of records and the filing of returns, and 
the compliance with the various other formalities 
required by the Act. Any structural changes, whether 
they involve a variation of objects, change of name, 
or a merger or takeover, will similarly require 
compliance with the appropriate statutory requirements. 
In imposing these duties and functions the Act does 
not specifically place them on the secretary, for, 
primarily, they are the responsibility of those who 
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manage the company. However, as we saw, they are not 
in the nature of managerial functions, and it would 
represent a wasteful use of valuable managerial skills 
to require the manager to carry them out. Moreover, 
not only are they numerous and wide-ranging and 
requiring of a detailed knowledge of company law 
and of accounting practice, but they are demanding 
in the sense that, being statutorily imposed, they 
are mandatory, and require to be done without fail and 
at the proper time and with a high degree of accuracy 
and thoroughness. As time has gone on, the legislation 
has tended to exercise an ever-increasing and stricter 
control over the company and this has been done by an 
increasing insistence on more accurate and detailed 
accounting as well as the submission of fuller 
reports and returns. Besides that, the penal sanctions 
have increasingly been made more stringent and 
increasingly been widened to control larger areas of 
the company's activities. This has meant that the 
clerical function has become more important and at the 
same time more demanding both in the time and skill of 
the person who carries it out. Therefore apart from the 
undesirable diversion of their managerial skills into 
non-managerial areas noted earlier, the plain fact is 
that the managers would not possess the knowledge, 
training or experience necessary to carry out the 
present day requirements of company legislation. 
Secretary made compulsory 
The legislature has recognised the importance of 
these statutory functions and duties now required of 
the company by making the appointment of a secretary 
compulsory and, moreover, by making it one that is 
to be exercised exclusively has made it into a full-time 
career. The legislature thus acknowledges that the 
secretary fulfils a role which is not merely desirable 
but essential to that which the legislature considers 
to be the proper functioning of a company . 
His functions limited 
The Act is of course not concerned with the wider 
issues of the welfare or efficiency of the company but 
the narrow point of its legality and its compliance 
with the statutory rules. Therefore the legislature 
has not legislated any wider than that necessary to 
achieve this limited aim, and inevitably this has 
led to the Act being expressed in terms which state 
the secretary's functions and duties in terms of 
these limited clerical and administrative functions. 
However, limited as these functions might be in the 
managerial sense, they are highly important in the 
eyes of the legislature, as the means to the company's 
discharge of its statutory obligations. 
Surprisingly however, compliance with these 
statutory requirements is not sought by the direct 
method of the imposition of any specific duties or 
functions on the secretary as such. There are it is 
true some duties and functions which are imposed 
on him directly, as for example, the duty placed on 
him 'by s. 231 to verify the statement of the 
company's affairs submitted to the Official 
Assignee, or a power given to him by ss. 29 and 117 
to certify by statutory declaration the company's 
compliance with certain statutory requirements. 
But these are trivial and in relation to the wide 
range of other duties and functions covered by the 
Act are quite inconsequential. Neither are his 
functions defined in the Act, as for example are 
directors' (see regulation 80 et seg of Table A). 
The definition of his functions has been left to the 
courts but in view of the unrealistic view which 
they have taken of his functions, as will be 
examined more fully later, and which have done so 
little to illuminate this area of company law, it 
is rather surprising that the legislature when 
making the appointment of a secretary compulsory 
in 1955 did not take the opportunity of expressly 
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prescribing his duties and functions. However, they 
did not, and the position is that, although there 
are many duties and functions imposed on the 
secretary, they are not imposed directly, but 
only indirectly, by the Act. These are, first of 
all, those duties and functions, which, being 
imposed on the company, are those which by their 
nature are cleacy of a clerical and administrative 
nature and thus fall naturally within the secretary's 
sphere of operations. These duties and functions 
include the keeping of books of account, the 
preparation of accounts and balance sheets, the 
preparation and filing of returns and so forth. 
In addition to these duties there are those further 
ones which could involve the secretary. These are 
those occasions where the statute imposes lia'bili ty 
on persons or members of the company, for the 
secretary, being both a person and a member, can 
also be liable - see for example, ss.J20, 321 and 
322 and note Re Maidstone Buildings Provisions Ltd 
(1971) 3 All E.R. 363. In that case the court held 
that a chartered accountant who acted as secretary 
and financial adviser to a company was not a person 
who was knowingly a party to the carrying on of the 
business of the company with intent to defraud 
creditors, contrary to the Companies Act 1948, 
s.332 (i.e. our s.320). The most that could be 
alleged against him was that being aware of the 
insolvent condition of the company he failed to 
take steps to prevent it trading fraudulently. 
Mere inertia on the part of a secretary does not, 
however, make him party to the carrying on of the 
company's business. 
Added to these possibilities are the provisions 
contained in some sections, e.g. ss. 151, 152, 153 
and 154, which in imposing duties and functions on 
the directors allow them to excuse themselves of 
those responsibilities by delegating the duties 
and functions to a reliable rerso~ , who obviously 
will be the secretary. 
Secretary as officer 
?. 
However the fact remains that, apart from the 
inconsequential exceptions of verification and certification 
noted earlier, or the larger responsibilities indirectly 
imposed on him as a person or a member, or a delegate, 
the Act does not require the secretary as such to do 
anything. Neither does it require him to have any 
qualification. This is rather a strange omission, 
especially after specifically requiring that such a 
person be appointed and that his name be recorded in the 
register. As it happens, however, this and the 
other omissions of definition referred to do not matter, 
for responsibility of the secretary is achieved by the 
device of fixing responsibility on him, not as secretary 
·but as the officer responsible for carrying out the 
secretarial tasks. This responsibility is achieved by the 
indirect method of placing the duty of compliance with 
the provisions of the Act on those persons who are 
officers of the company and then defining the term 
"officer" to include the secretary. 
We see then that in the main the functions and 
duties of the secretary under the statute are not 
specifically prescribed, but are merely those duties 
and functions which should he wilfully and knowingly 
permit default in their discharge would make him liable 
as an officer. Added to this must be those responsibilities 
imposed on the secretary 'by reason of his being a 
person, or a member of the company, or a delegate of 
the directors, as noted earlier. 
A matter of interpretation 
But by whatever device he is made liable, in the 
final analysis the scope of his duties will depend, not 
upon his being an officer, or for that matter on his being 
a person or a member, but upon whether the duties are such 
as would normally fall within the secretary's province. 
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This is largely a matter of interpretation. So~e of 
the duties and functions laid on the company are so 
clearly within the secretary's province that the 
person filling that position would be liable as a 
defaulting officer should he not do them. One 
such obvious function would be the issuing of 
certificates of shares under s.90; another would be 
the registration of charges pursuant to s.102. These 
duties and functions cannot 'be discharged by the 
company, but only by an agent; they are so obviously 
ministerial that it must be inferred that the 
legislature in insisting upon the appointment of 
a secretary, whose traditional function is to do this 
work, and by including him in the definition of 
officer, and by making the defaulting officer liable, 
has intended that the secretary should primarily be 
the person responsible. Thus ·by means of the linkage 
of a series of propositions, the responsibility of 
the secretary is made manifest. One wonders why the 
legislature, with an Act available before them, 
chooses to work in this round-about fashion. 
As already noted, the tendency is for the 
legislature to exercise an ever-increasing and stricter 
control over the company by requiring more accurate 
and more detailed accounting, and fuller reports and 
returns, and by making the penal sanctions more 
stringent, and windening them to include a larger 
class of activity. But the legislature does not 
stop there, for the area of the possible liability of 
an officer is not restricted to these routine 
administrative responsibilities, but extends to cover 
the full range of the company's activities. Thus 
an officer is liable for misfeasance or breach of trust 
under s.321. Similarly those protections provided by 
s.468 against actions for negligence or other defaults 
are given to officers. Therefore the area of the 
company's activities in which the secretary can be 
involved is greatly enlarged. This means that the 
9. 
secretarial responsibilities under the Act are becoming 
more important, and that likewise the secretary's status 
is improving. His status comes however, not from his 
designation as secretary, but from the inclusion of 
such designation in the term "officer". He is thus 
equated, in this respect at least, with director and 
manager. As Lord Denning says at p.19 in Panorama 
Developments v. Fidelis Fabrics (1971) 3 All E.R, 16 -
"A company secretary is a much more important 
person nowadays than he was in 1887. He is 
an officer of the company with extensive 
duties and responsibilities." 
In that case the secretary of the defendant 
company fraudulently ordered hire cars from the 
plaintiff, stating that they were required for the 
purposes of the defendant's business. The defendant 
claimed that the secretary had no authority to make 
contracts and representations on behalf of the company. 
Similarly in those cases where the company is 
involved in criminal liability arising from the acts 
of the secretary, it is usually his act as an officer 
rather than as secretary that makes it the act of 
the company. See Registrar of Trading v. W.H. Smith 
(1969) 3 All E.R. 1065, where it was sought to make 
the local managers liable as officers, and it was 
held that the word "officer" excluded a local manager 
·but included a secretary. See also Tesco Supermarkets 
hl.Q. v. Nattrass (1971) 2 All E.R. 127, where a secretary 
was considered to ·be included in the class of officer 
who acted as the directing mind and will of the company. 
Other statutory requirements 
Then there is the responsibility of ensuring the 
company's compliance with various other Acts. Thus the 
Factories Act 1946, the Accident Compensation Act 1973, 
and other Acts will require the making of various 
reports in a variety of different circumstances. 
Although as with the Companies Act, theoretically the 
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liability for compliance with the statutes will be 
placed on the company and its directors, in practice 
the responsibility to see that the duty is discharged 
will fall upon the secretary, and he will usually be 
the person in default should the duty not be carried 
out. As with the duties imposed by the Companies 
Act, so with these statutes, the duties imposed by 
them are ever-expanding as society exercises an 
increasing control over a wider range of activities. 
Thus, just as the need to protect investors and 
creditors has led to an increase in the control and 
oversight exercised by the Companies Act, so the 
need to protect consumers and workers has led to 
similar provisions being included in the Health 
Act 1956, Factories Act 1946 and many other Acts. 
However, as we shall see, the secretary's real 
importance does not depend upon these duties and 
functions which he performs under the Companies and 
other Acts, which are after all merely routine and 
clerical, but from his high executive standing 
within the company arising from the importance and 
value of his specialised and expert knowledge in 
the affairs of the company. 
Powers 
We have noted the various statutory duties and 
functions which are imposed by the Act, either expressly 
or by implication, on the company secretary. The 
imposition of these duties will in turn, by implication, 
invest the secretary with those powers which are 
necessary to enable him to carry them out. For 
example, the secretary will have an implied authority, 
flowing from his responsibility to keep the books and to 
file returns, to purchase the necessary books and forms. 
Similarly he will have power to arrange to have the 
company seal prepared, and to have the company's 
name painted on the company premises. See In re King's Cross 
Industrial Dwellings Co, (1870) L.R. 11 Eq. 149, where it 
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was taken for granted that a company would be bound by 
its secretary's contract for that which was essential 
to the existence of the company - in that case, the 
advertising of the company prospectus. See also the 
Panorama case. However these powers which derive 
from his statutory functions and duties are of little 
consequence. Indeed, far more impressive are the 
things which, according to the cases, he cannot do, 
although they are related to his duties and functions 
under the statute. Thus he cannot call a meeting 
without the directors' instructions, Haycraft Gold 
(1900) 2 Ch. 230; or alter the minutes, In re Cawley 
(1889) 42 Ch. D. 290, or register shares, CHida Mines 
v. Anderson (1905) 22 T.L.R. 27. These cases show 
how limited are the incidental powers which the 
courts have considered as being necessarily invested 
in the secretary to enable him to carry out his 
statutory functions. 
Liabilities 
We noted that the secretary was defined in the Act 
as being included in the term "officer" and that the 
Act imposed a wide range of penalties on defaulting 
officers. The main liability of the secretary under 
the Act derives therefore from the possibility that 
any failure, omission, or default of the company in 
any of its statutory duties will make him liable 
as a defaulting officer. Whether it will or not will 
depend upon whether the statutory duties are properly 
the secretary's responsibility. As we saw, in very 
many cases they will be, ·because they will have been 
delegated to him by the board. Thus the statutory 
requirements of the keeping of proper books of account, 
of seeing that proper balance sheets are prepared and 
that they comply with the statutory requirements as to 
form and content, are imposed by the Act primarily 
on the directors but, as expressly recognised by the 
Act, as for example, in such sections as 151, 152 and 
12. 
153, these responsibilities may be delegated to others, 
and so long as the directors reasonably believe their 
delegates to be competent and reliable, the directors 
are relieved of liability, and the delegates become 
liable. As far as the accounts are concerned these 
responsibilities will fall on the person who prepares 
the accounts, who will be the secretary, and on the 
auditor who will audit and certify those accounts -
see s.166. In the case of a private company, unless 
it is a "non-exempt private company", the requirement 
of having an auditor may be dispensed with. Then 
s.lJJ will also operate to exempt it fro~ filing 
copies of balance sheets and auditor's reports 
with the Registrar. In such cases, the auditor will 
have dropped out of the picture and any delegated 
responsibility remaining will be that of the secretary 
alone. How well he discharges that responsibility 
will depend largely on his skill and application. 
Where he is a chartered accountant or chartered 
secretary, a high standard of competence will be 
required of him, not only by the respective Accountants 
and Secretaries societies through their disciplinary 
requirements, ·but also by the law, in that negligence 
'by such a person will not be readily excused under 
s.468. See Dimond Manufacturing Co. Ltd, v. Hamilton 
(1969 N.Z.L.R. 609. That case concerned the negligent 
preparation of a balance sheet 'by an accountant. 
Speaking of the higher standard of care resting on 
directors, Turner J. said at p,630 -
"I agree (with what Gore-Browne had to say about directors) and add that the same observation can be made in respect of a professional secretary ••• " 
The ground on which the directors are able to escape 
liability for those statutory duties which they have 
delegated is their reasonable belief in the competence 
of their delegate. In other words they must exercise 
proper care in the selection of the officer who is to 
be made responsible for the carrying out of this work, 
1J. 
Often, as for example, in the case of a public company, 
or even a large private company, prudence will dictate 
that a delegate with adequate professional skill and 
training be chosen. Hence it may well be that the 
selection of a person other than one who is qualified 
as a chartered accountant or chartered secretary 
could in some circumstances constitute a failure by 
the director to exercise care. 
Domestic and internal 
We come now to the second head under which the 
duties and functions of the secretary, as well as his 
powers and liabilities, may be studied, that dealing 
with those activities arising out of his relationship 
with his own company. These are all those matters 
of internal administration of the company. Here the 
secretary appears in his true light. Here he fulfills 
the role of a senior executive officer and will have 
duties and functions, as well as powers, commensurate 
with that ranking. Nevertheless as a secretary he 
remains the servant of the company and it is his duty to 
carry out the instructions given to him by those who 
manage the company. His first duty will therefore be 
towards the board of directors. But it is not his only 
duty. He will also have duties under the Act towards 
others, e.g. towards shareholders in relation to meetings 
and share transactions. Normally of course he cannot 
call a meeting without board approval, or register a 
share transfer without similar approval, as noted 
earlier. But otherwise he must see that the duties 
owing to these other persons are discharged, and that 
the rights of shareholders and others under the Act, 
as well as customers and members of the public, are 
protected, even should their interests be in conflict 
with one another, or with those of the board, As in 
other areas, here too, his responsibilities are 
increasing. As John Perham in The Embattled Company 
Secretary (January 1973) The Chartered Secretary 21 
states -
14, 
",., Today, when almost every aspect of company 
activity is coming under attack from the outside, 
it makes hi~ (i.e. the secretary) one of the most 
visible, For as government gets nosier, 
stockholders louder and consumers angrier, the 
secretary is the key liaison man between his 
company and all these outside forces," 
But throughout it all, the secretary remains the 
servant of the company and the appointee of the board, 
and his first task therefore is to be thoroughly 
conversant with the company's memorandum and articles 
of association, as well as statute and company law 
generally, so that he can advise his board in these 
areas and ensure that their actions and policies are 
in compliance with their powers and the law generally, 
He will be required to be well informed on market 
trading and financial matters and to be able to advise 
the board in these areas. These duties, and more, 
are considered by writers in this field as being 
within the province of the secretary - see e.g. Job 
Description for the Company Secretary, an article by 
R, Neilson in (January 1973) The Chartered Secretary 5, 
in which he allocates the secretary's duties under 
the broad heads of secretarial and legal; financial 
and management control; administration; and general. 
Perhaps these views of the role of the company secretary 
are best summarised in the preface to the 7th edition 
of Paul's Secretarial and Administrative Practice, 
where the learned author states them in these words -
",,, an efficient corporation secretary is vitally 
concerned with economic studies; human relations, 
i,e, with directors, shareholders, the Stock 
Exchange and the public; financial management; 
the protection of assets; relevant legislation, 
both current and new, and taxation," 
We see then that writers on the subject see the 
secretary's role and functions as being very wide indeed. 
This accords generally with the findings of Lindgren, 
based on a survey of a number of companies in Australia, 
that the secretary is a very important officer within 
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the company's domestic heirarchy - see (1974) B,L,R, 288. 
The courts however, it must be noted, have adopted a ~uch 
more restricted view, In particular they do not accept 
that the giving of financial advice is part of the 
secretary's function - see Re Maidstone Buildings 
Provisions Ltd, That judgment does not stand alone, 
but is in line with the traditional attitude of the 
courts which has been expressed in a long line of 
cases stretching back to the last century. See for 
example Newlands v. National Employers' Accident 
Association (1885) 54 L,J,Q.B. 428. In that case a 
secretary fraudulently promised that if the plaintiff 
took shares in the company he would be appointed as 
its solicitor. The plaintiff applied for and was 
allotted the shares. The secretary also fraudulently 
represented that the plaintiff had been duly appointed 
solicitor. The court held that the company were not 
·bound by the secretary's representations. Brett M.R. 
at n,430 stated the position thus -
"A secretary is a mere servant; his position is that he is to do what he is told and no person can assume that he has any authority to 
represent anything at all ••• " 
Although the courts showed a change in attitude 
towards the secretary in Panorama's case, their 
attitude still falls far short of that of these 
writers. Panorama's case will be dealt with more 
fully later; meantime we may note that the courts 
are not prepared to go as far as these writers (and 
the business world generally) in the recognition of 
the width of the secretary's powers, either within 
the co~pany in its internal arrangements, or in its 
external relations towards outsiders, Perhaps the 
prescription put forward by the secretary in 
Dimond's case, and accepted by the Court, more accurately 
defines his general duties towards the company. 
There the secretary was also an accountant and 
described some of his duties as an accountant's 
duties but in the context in which they were being 
exercised there is little doubt that they were 
16. 
secretarial. They are stated at p.618 thus -
"••• There was a daily collection of mail, and the distribution, and dealing with mail, recording of cash and banking of the cash. The processing and verification of all inward accounts and the payment of those accounts. That means all the money coming into and going out pass through our office. We attended weekly to the payment of wages ••• (the company) prepared the wages but we verified them and paid them and enveloped them. I attended to all the matters of insurance. Through our office were typed and processed all the outward invoices. I attended to correspondence, we attended to all matters of taxation, all co'llpany documents," 
Although the secretary was not a member of the 
staff of the company but an independent professional, 
the prescription did presumably show the full 
secretarial function. It will be seen that there is 
no mention of the secretary being required to give 
financial advice. Even though Panorama's case has 
widened the area of his functions, it does not 
refer to financial advice. Therefore, although in 
many cases the giving of such advice will be undertaken 
by the secretary, as part of his normal activities, 
that will arise not from any duty requirement but a 
practice based on his expert knowledge in these 
matters. That will be particularly so where by 
reason of his also being a chartered accountant he 
will be engaged by the company to prepare its tax 
return. However as Pennycuick V.C. held in Re Maidstone, 
when giving financial advice, the secretary is acting 
not as secretary but in the role of financial adviser. 
Again some writers see the secretary as playing a 
leading part in such matters as takeovers and mergers. 
See The Role of the Secretary In Take Over Bids, by 
D.C.I. Marwood, in July (1973) The Chartered Secretary, 9; 
and The Secretary In A Financial Environment, by 
I.E. Reckley, in (April 1975) The Chartered Secretary 5. 
In the latter writer's view the true picture of the 
secretary "is one of a generalist operating with, and 
to some extent controlling the activities of, the specialist 
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managers of the corporate whole." It may be however, that 
in this area too, these writers overstate the position. 
No doubt the secretary will play an important role in such 
matters, but that role will be confined to putting into 
effect the decisions of the board rather than in advising 
them as to what decisions to make as these two writers 
would seem to suggest. Even on the most favourable view,, 
that expressed in Panorama, the secretary's powers fall 
short of managerial functions, and in Re Maidstone, financial 
functions were expressly held not to fall within the 
secretary's province. Still there is no doubt as these 
writers say that, because of his position and skill, 
the secretary does exercise a considerable influence 
over the actions and policies of the board and that on 
the whole it is a beneficial influence and one which 
enhances the efficiency of management. 
But the secretary also exercises his skills to a much 
greater extent in the company's day-to-day operations, 
for he is of course responsible for staffing matters, 
including recruitment and records. As stated by Lord 
Denning in Panorama, the secretary is certainly entitled 
to sign contracts connected with the administrative side 
of a company's affairs such as employing staff. In fact 
not only staffing, but all matters falling within the 
domestic domain are the responsibility of the secretary. 
We saw this in the prescription of the secretary's duties 
referred to in Dimond's case. Although largely routine, 
these functions and duties, being housekeeping matters, 
are very important to the well-being of the company. It 
is in this area that the responsibilities of the secretary 
have grown so much over the years and where he has mainly 
exercised his talents and where, through improving old 
skills and developing new ones, he has brought the office 
of secretary to the high standard which we see today. 
Secretaries have joined together to form a professional 
body which has for its object the promotion and advancement 
of the professional standing of its mem·bers. This has been 
achieved by fostering education and training, and the 
setting of high standards of skill and ethics which its 
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members must attain. 
It is this development of skill in the housekeeping 
area of the company's affairs that has been the main 
reason for the improved status of the modern secretary. 
Company managers and the business world generally have 
come to accept the secretary's expertise in this area. 
However, as we noted, generally speaking, this improved 
standard of skill and professionalism, as well as 
enlarged responsibilities, have not been recognised 
either by the legislature or by the courts. In the 
case of the legislature, its only concern is that 
creditors and investors be protected, and the legislature 
has been content therefore to legislate for those 
purposes only, and although the duties i~posed on the 
secretary in consequence are considerable, they are 
administrative and clerical only, and trifling when 
compared to his functions towards the company in 
relation to its internal administration and 
operations in the widest sense. 
A similar limited and unrealistic view has been 
adopted by the courts. There the issue has invariably 
been one concerning the company's external relations, 
to which issue, skill and responsibility within the 
company are not directly relevant. Nevertheless 
these matters are the essence of the secretarial 
function, and are therefore atters which should, one 
would think, serve to indicate to the court the extent 
of the secretary's powers to represent the company 
towards outsiders. It seems however that rarely if 
ever is evidence submitted on this point and the 
matter is left largely to "the general knowledge of 
business which is attributed to the court" (per 
Brett M.R. in Newlands case). As pointed out by one 
writer, no empirical study has ever been made in 
this area, and in the absence of such study, the 
knowledge of the court rests exclusively upon the 
experienc~ and intuition of the judges. (see Lindgren 
46 A.L.J. 385 and (1974) Business LoR. 288). It is 
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true that in the Panorama case the judges did extend 
the secretary's powers, but that extension was based not 
on any evidence of any organised empirical study but 
on the more liberal subjective attitudes of the judges 
who dealt with the case. This evidential aspect 
will be dealt with more fully later in this paper. 
Powers 
As we noted, the functions and duties of the 
secretary, in regard to the internal administration 
of the co'ilpany are very considerable indeed, and 
relate to the total housekeeping activity. The 
secretary will therefore have i~plied the authority 
necessary to discharge those wide responsibilities. 
It is impossible to list them, but as indicated by 
Lord Denning in the Panorama case, they will 
cer+8 inly include the signing of contracts connected 
with the ad'ilinistrative side of a company's affairs, 
such as employing staff, and ordering cars, and so 
forth. 
Liabilities 
Certain liabilities devolve upon the secretary 
towards the company arising out of the employment 
contract. Thus where he is a servant of the 
company he owes, as an implied term of the contract 
of e'ilployment, the duty of care and will be liable 
to indemnify his e'ilployer against any loss suffered 
as a result of any breach of that contractual duty -
Lister v. Romford Ice Co. (1957) A.C. 555. Where the 
secretary is the servant of the company employed in a 
master-servant relationship the company 
would usually not invoke this right, on the grounds of 
loyalty to its servant and the servant's lack of 
funds. Exactly the same may be said, both as to the 
liability and the waiving of the remedy, about a 
tort committed by the secretary for which the company 
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is vicariously liable. However if the secretary were 
insured it would be a different matter, in regard to 
both his contractual and his tortious liability. 
Therefore, if the day ever comes, as it may well do, 
where secretaries, even when e11ployed in a master-
servant relationship, are required to be insured, we 
might see some activation of these possible remedies 
in this master-servant area. This could well occur, 
for example, with the increasingly common practice of 
chartered accountants acting as secretaries, for in 
their case they are often covered by insurance against 
negligence. 
Where the secretary is an independent contractor 
the position is entirely different. Here the restraints 
of loyalty no longer operate, for the secretary will be 
a professional secretary serving a number of co11panies 
who will 'be his clients and the relationship will be 
purely a business one. See, for example, such cases 
as Kleinwort v. Automatic Machine Corpn (1934) 50 T.L.R. 
244, and Meulen's Hair Styling v. c.r.R. (1963) N.Z.L.R. 795. 
In the first case, the defendant ran a rent-a-secretary 
service so to speak, and in the second case the secretary 
who was a chartered accountant was the secretary of 
sixteen different companies. See also Dimond's case. Nor 
is there in these cases any lack of financial substance, 
for the professional ::; er .., ry will invariably be 
insured against clai11s for professional negligence. 
Although the relationship between the secretary and the 
company is no longer a strict master-servant one, it is 
still contractual, and no doubt the company suffering 
loss from the negligence of the professional secretary 
within the contractual arrangement could invoke breach of 
an implied contractual term under the principle in 
Lister's case. However the more usual remedy will be 
the wider one arising from tort and especially that of 
negligent misstatement as evidenced in such cases as 
Hedley Byrne and Co. v. Heller and Partners Ltd (1964) 
A.C. 465. This re11edy was invo'.,. ed in Dimond's case. 
There a professional secretary had been negligent in 
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the preparation of a balance sheet which he disclosed 
to a prospective investor. It was held that the 
special relationship necessary to support a Hedley Byrne 
type of action existed between the secretary and the 
prospective investor whom he had advised. Although 
that case concerned the secretary's dealings with an 
outsider, and the remedy was invoked by such 
outsider, the principle would just as readily apply 
where the secretary was advising the company. In 
regard to any action ·by another against the secretary 
for negligent advice, it should be noted that it need 
not ·be against him as secretary but merely as 
adviser, for following Re Maidstone 's case, often 
the advice, e.g. financial, will be given, not as 
secretary, ·but in so'Tie wider capacity. Also to be 
noted are the provisions of s.J21 which provide for 
a liquidator or other person concerned with the winding 
up of a company to take proceedings against persons 
(which would include a secretary) who have been 
guilty of misfeasance in relation to the affairs of 
the company. 
External 
We now come to the third head of the duties, functions, 
powers and liabilities of the company secretary. This 
relates to the duties and functions which exist between 
the company and outsiders and which are exercised by the 
secretary. By far the most important and usual way in 
which a secretary involves his company with outsiders is 
by exercising a power, contractual or otherwise, on 
behalf of the company. As we shall see, some of these, 
being those in the nature of contractual powers,are 
based on agency principles, with the secretary acting as 
an agent on behalf of the company; in others, where 
nothing in the nature of a contract or representation 
exists, he is treated as one of the company's organs. 
Thus in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v. Nattrass (1971) 2 All 
E.R. 127 he was treated as the directing mind and will of 
the company to commit a crime and in Donato v. Legion Cabs 
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(1966) 2 N.S.W,R. 583 as the company's natural 
mouthpiece for the purposes of publishing a libel. 
In every case it is a matter of authority - in the 
agency situation, the secretary is invested with 
authority by delegation from a principal; in the 
others, his power comes not from any delegation 
but by reason of his status or position in the 
body corporate. 
How the secretary can commit the company 
There are three different ways in which the secretary 
can 'bind his company to outsiders. First he can enter 
into a contract on behalf of the company. This is the 
usual agency situation with the secretary acting as the 
agent of the company, either upon the basis of a 
representation by the company, that is, by an 
apparent authoritJ, or upon the representation by the 
agent, that L", by a warranty of authority, The most 
common example of the agency situation is where the 
secretary enters into a contract in the name of the 
company, e.g. for the purchase of boiler plates, which 
is an act of management (see Williams v. Chester and 
Holyhead Railway Co (1851) 17 L.T.0.3. 269), or for the 
purchase of office equipment or the hire of cars, 
which is an act of administration - see the Panorama 
case, Secondly he can ~ake a representation to another 
whereby that other, on the strength of such representation, 
enters into a contract with a third party. Here the 
secretary is not ~aking a contract on behalf of the 
company but is ~erely giving information to an inquirer 
who requires the information to enable him to decide 
whether or not to enter into a contract with a third 
party. The third party may of course be the company 
itself, as in Newland's case or so~e other person, as in 
Barnett Hoares and Co. v. South London Tramways Co. (1887) 
'18 Q.B.D. 815. In that case a company was held not 
bound by its secretary's representation as to the amount 
of retention 'Tloney owed by the company to its contractors, 
on the faith of which the plaintiff lent money to them. 
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But in neither case does the secretary act in the 
formation of the contract or warrant his authority. 
The third way in which the secretary may commit his 
company is where he gives information on behalf of 
the company. It may be information which the 
company is required to disclose under legal 
compulsion, e.g. under an order of discovery, or 
it may be something that it confesses or admits 
to, and the secretary speaks for the company. 
See Harris v. MacQuarrie Distributors Pty Ltd 
(1967) V.R. 257, in which case it was held that a 
person who was both a director and the secretary 
of a company did not have~•by reason only of his filling 
those offices, power to bind his company by an 
admission to a council inspector. Here the 
secretary's authority is based on agency principles. 
Contrasted with that case is Donato v. Legion Cabs Ltd 
(1966) 2 N.S.W.R. 583, where the secretary published 
a libel for which act the company was held liable 
and it was held that the authority of the secretary 
to speak did not depend upon agency principles 
but on the secretary filling the role of the natural 
mouthpiece of the company. 
The secretary as agent 
Like any other body, a company if it wishes to make 
a representation or enter into a contract, can only 
act through its agent, and a large part of the problem 
in this area of contract and representation is to know 
precisely the powers possessed by the agent so that 
an outsider dealing with him as the agent of the 
company can be sure that he has the necessary 
authority to bind the company. One could always 
check on this point by referring to the articles which 
specify the powers of the company, and which are open 
to public inspection, but business would become 
difficult if not impossible if every person having 
dealings with a company were required to check on the 
existence and scope of the agent's powers. Nevertheless, 
strictly speaking, that is the clear consequence of 
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the legal rule that no principal can be bound by the 
act or representation of an agent unless the agent 
purporting to bind the principal has been given the 
necessary authority, either actually or ostensibly, 
It is the responsibility of the third party to 
satisfy himself on this point, either by actual 
knowledge or from proper inference. 
How an agent binds the company 
It will be necessary to examine this question of 
how a secretary can bind his company in rather more 
detail. 
As we noted, circumstances in which a company may 
be bound ·by the acts of its secretary in the field 
of contract and representation are those in which 
the secretary acts as the agent of the company. 
This principal-agent relationship will arise where 
there has ·been authority, either actual or apparent, 
delegated to the secretary by the company. Actual 
authority arises from an appropriate contract 
existing ·between the principal and the agent whereby 
the latter's powers are defined, and to which 
contract the outsider is a stranger. Apparent or 
ostensible authority arises not from any such principal-
agent contract but out of a relationship between the 
principal and a third party whereby the principal 
represents to the third party the existence of the 
agent's authority. It is based on estoppel whereby 
the principal is precluded from denying the appointment: 
Freeman and Lockyer v. Buckhurst Park Properties Ltd 
(1964) 2 Q.B. 480, 
Actual authority 
This can be express or implied. It is express when 
it is given by express words, such as when there is a 
delegation of particular duties to the secretary 
contained in the articles or, as would be more 
usual, delegation to him by the board of directors, 
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by resolution, or by the managing director by 
direction. It is implied when it is inferred from 
the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of 
the case, such as when the articles or, as is more 
usual, the board, appoint a person as secretary. 
By such appointment the company impliedly authorises 
the secretary to do all such things as fall within 
the usual scope of that office: Hely-Hutchinson v. 
Brayhead Ltd (1968) 1 Q.B. 549. 
In the case of the secretary, these functions are 
those administrative and ministerial ones which a 
secretary is normally required to do. He has, in 
regard to such matters, authority, either express 
or implied, arising out of his appointment, to 
enter into contracts on behalf of the company. One 
obvious case of express actual authority would be 
that relating to those duties expressly imposed on 
the secretary ·by the Act. From this express 
authority there would be inferred the implied 
authority necessary to carry out those acts incidental 
to these express duties. An example of this would 
·be the authority to purchase the necessary statutory 
forms. See In re King's Cross Industrial Dwellings 
Co, (1870) L.R. 11 Eq. 149, where it was held that 
a company would be ·bound by its secretary's contract 
for that which was essential to the existence of the 
company. As stated in that case - "If one thing is 
plain, it is that the secretary has implied 
authority to pledge the credit of the company for 
issuing advertisements, of which the company is to 
have the benefit or chance of benefit." 
But as we shall see, the tendency of the courts 
has been to reduce the usual authority of the secretary 
almost to vanishing point - see Newlands,and Barnett 
cases; also Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated 
(1906) A.c. 439, where the secretary was party to 
the issue of certain forged share certificates. It 
was held that the company was not liable for his fraud; 
it had never held out the secretary as having authority 
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to do more than the mere ministerial act of delivering 
certificates. The consequence of this narrow 
attitude was that no third party could safely 
contract with the secretary. As we saw, in Panorama 
the narrow view was abandoned, and in its place 
it was held that the scope of the secretary's powers 
and functions, although still administrative and 
never managerial,extended to contracts relating to 
the employment of staff, the ordering of office 
machinery and stationery, the hiring of cars to meet 
customers of the company, and similar matters. In 
that case the court referred to the authority as 
"ostensible authority" although the authority there 
being exercised falls within the example of implied 
actual authority given by Lord Denning in Hely-
Hutchinson's case. However, by whatever name it is 
called, the effect of this judgment was to extend 
the area of the actual authority implied to the 
secretary by recognising a wider range of duties 
and functions as being within the usual scope of 
that office. Such extension, since it involved an 
increase in what was considered to be within the 
usual scope of the secretary's authority, has in 
turn also extended the area of his ostensible 
authority. 
There can of course be no authority of any sort -
actual or ostensible - unless the authority purported 
to be exercised is within the powers of the company. 
Therefore in determining whether the company is bound 
by a particular act or representation of the 
secretary, the first inquiry must always be as to 
the powers of the company. If the requisite powers 
to enter into the proposed contract are found to 
exist, then the next inquiry must be whether the 
contract comes within the particular authority of that 
particular officer. We know that the extent of a 
company's powers are those contained in its memorandum 
and articles, and that these documents will be filed, 
and that everyone dealing with the company is deemed 
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to have notice of them. 
In theory, the first thing a third party should do, 
therefore, is to check the memorandum of association, to 
confirm that the secretary's proposed action is 
within the objects clause of the company. However, 
examination of the memorandum of association, only 
serves to show whether the company is empowered to 
enter into such contracts; it is still necessary, 
assuming that it can, to know by whom. This will be 
contained in the articles of association. These 
will usually be either those set out in Table A of 
the Act or ones which substantially follow them. 
On looking through Table A one will see that they 
contain very little to encourage a person to deal 
with the secretary of the company as its agent, for 
nowhere are there conferred on him anything in the 
nature of managerial functions. These are wholly 
reserved to the directors, whose powers of 
delegation are severely limited - see e.g. regulation 102. However, one function, that of the signing of cheques 
and bills, may be delegated - see regulation 85. 
It follows that any authority purported to be 
exercised by a secretary which is clearly contrary to 
those documents cannot be within his actual authority 
and will not bind the company. Thus a secretary cannot 
have authority to do something which is ultra vires 
the company. Nor could he do something which the 
articles clearly show as not being within his 
authority, e.g. where they expressly provide for 
the signing of cheques by nominated persons who do 
not include the secretary. 
One item of information which will be in the 
record will be the details of the appointment of the 
secretary, and his name. Hence no one can assume 
without more than a person of some other name has 
the authority of the secretary. But any officer of 
the company who is so authorised may act as secretary 
(s.181). Whether the person named as secretary or an 
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authorised officer is exercising the power, the 
authority which he may exercise will be limited to 
that needed to perform his secretarial functions. 
Although these have been enlarged by the Panorama 
case, they are nevertheless still restricted to 
administrative and ministerial functions and do 
not extend to managerial functions. Thus although 
the secretary in the Panorama case could order cars, 
he would not have been permitted to order cloth, and 
in the absence of special authorisation no one could 
safely assume that he could. 
However, so long as everthing, so far as it can 
be checked by perusal of the public record, appears 
to be in order and as being adequate to authorise 
the exercise of the power by the secretary, a third 
party is entitled to assume that all those matters 
of internal management which may be necessary to 
make the acts of the company regular will have been 
complied with, unless he has actual knowledge to 
the contrary, or is put on inquiry - Royal British 
Bank v. Turquand (1856) 6 E. and B. 327. The fact 
that some other person other than the named secretary 
is acting will obviously put the third party on 
inquiry, but any explanation reasonable in the 
circumstances, e.g. in routine matters that the 
named secretary was on leave, will suffice to satisfy 
the inquiry. The regularity of his appointment 
being confirmed, the authorised officer would have 
actual authority to carry out the secretarial functions 
of the company. As with the named secretary, his 
powers will be express insofar as they are contained 
in the terms of his appointment, or are those expressly 
required of or allowed to him under the Companies Act 
(ss. 29, 117), and will be implied insofar as they fall 
within the scope of a secretary's usual authority. 
As we saw, Panorama's case, although referring to 
the authority as "ostensible", has somewhat widened 
the scope of his usual authority to include those 
activities which are involved in the day-to-day running 
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of the company. But nevertheless the assumption of 
regularity and thus the conferment of actual authority 
should not be pushed too far. Often the articles will 
empower the board to delegate, as for example, the 
signing of cheques, as in regulation 85 of the 
articles contained in Ta'ble A. Al though it is 
conceivable that they might have delegated the power 
to the secretary, yet such duties are not sufficiently 
part of his usual functions for it to be assumed that, 
because the board could have delegated this power to 
him, they will have in fact done so - Rama Corpn Ltd 
v. Proved Tin and General Investments Ltd (1952) 
2 Q.B. 147. Nor should one assume that the secretary 
has any authority to certificate share transfers. 
Although this is one of his most common statutory 
functions, he will not have power to bind the company 
unless, as provided in s.89, he is actually so 
authorised. 
Ostensible or apparent power 
We now leave actual authority to deal with those 
occasions where the authority of the secretary arises 
not from any actual appointment of him as agent by 
of the company but by a representation or a holding out, 
such appointment made by the company to a third party. 
As we noted, this is called ostensible or apparent 
authority, and is the authority of an agent as it 
appears to others. It often coincides with actual 
authority. Thus, when the ·board appoint the secretary, 
they invest him not only with implied authority but 
also with ostensible authority to do all such things 
as fall within the usual scope of that office. 
Other people who see him acting as secretary are 
entitled to assume that he has the usual authority 
of a secretary. As we saw, the main effect of the 
Panorama case was to enlarge the area covered by the 
usual scope of the secretary's office, and that this 
has had the effect of enlarging the area of both his 
implied actual and his ostensible authority. But 
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sometimes ostensible authority exceeds actual authority. 
For instance, when the board appoint the secretary, they 
may expressly limit his authority in some way. In that 
case his actual authority is subject to this limitation, 
'but his ostensible authority includes all the usual 
authority of a secretary. The company is bound by his 
ostensible authority in his dealing with those who do 
not know of the limitation. See Wilson v. Gilbert 
(1965) 39 A.L.J.R. J48, which concerned a manager 
rather than a secretary ·but the principle is the same. 
There the manager of an insurance company, who as 
part of his normal functions had power to write 
guarantee bonds, had ·been expressly instructed to 
cease to write such bonds. It was held that, despite 
this limitation of his actual authority, his ostensible 
authority remained to authorise the continued writing 
of such business. 
Or again, the secretary may not be appointed in fact, 
but only appear to be so - see e.g. Mahoney v. ~ 
Holyford Mining Co. (1875) L.R.7 H.L. 869. In that case 
a~ facto secretary's representation to a bank as to who 
were the company's signatories on its cheques bound the 
company. 
Two methods of holding out 
There may be a holding out and thus the creation of 
apparent authority under two circumstances - where, as 
in the examples given, the secretary is represented 
as having the usual powers of a secretary but which in 
fact he has not, and the other where he is represented 
as possessing unusual powers which in fact he does not 
possess. Although both cases are examples of a holding 
out by the company, and are therefore based on an 
estoppel whereby the company is precluded from denying 
its representation, there are differences between the 
two relative to the need for actual knowledge of the 
representation. 
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Usual authority 
This is the first of the two methods of creating 
ostensible authority, and arises in those circumstances 
where a third party may depend upon the usual authority 
of the secretary. Of course where there is actual 
appointment with no curtailment of powers, there is 
actual authority and there is no problem; it is only 
where there is no appointment or there is a limitation 
on the secretary's powers that the doctrine needs to 
be invoked. Where a third party deals with a company 
through a person who is held out as the secretary and 
who purports to exercise a power which a secretary 
usually has, the third party can hold the company 
liable for the secretary's acts, even though the 
latter is not in fact the secretary, or, if he is, 
should he be exceeding his actual authority ·because 
of some limitation imposed on it. The difficulty 
will be to know what is "usual". We know that the 
secretary usually exercises administrative and 
ministerial powers, but the problem has been that 
throughout the years the courts have reduced these 
"usual" powers virtually to nothing - see Ba,r:nett's 
case. This has been changed recently with the 
Panorama case, where the administrative powers of the 
secretary were spelled out more generously. In other 
words they became part of his usual powers so that 
as long as a third party dealt with a person occupying 
that position, then he was entitled to assume that 
that person's usual authority covered those functions. 
This protection will not operate however where the 
third party knows that the person is not the secretary, 
or that he has no actual authority, or if the circumstances 
are such as to put the third party on inquiry, or if 
there is something contained in the public documents 
(which the third party is deemed to have read) which 
shows that there could be no actual authority. Where 
the rule operates it will however operate regardless 
of whether or not the person invoking it has read the 
articles. 
unusual authority 
This is the second method whereby ostensible authority 
32. 
might arise. It applies where the secretary is 
exercising an unusual authority so that the rule just 
discussed does not apply. Here to gain protection 
there must ·be a representation by the company that the 
secretary possesses that unusual authority and a 
reliance placed on such representation by the third 
party. As in the other case, the need for the rule 
applies only where the secretary lacks actual authority. 
Where the secretary is purporting to exercise an 
authority that a secretary does not usually have, 
should he be exceeding his actual authority, the 
third party will not be protected, unless the 
secretary was represented by the company as having 
that unusual authority and the third party relied 
on it. But to rely on a state of affairs so as to 
be induced to act, a person must have actual 
knowledge of that state of affairs; constructive 
notice alone is not sufficient. Therefore, before 
he can invoke any power given in, say, the articles, 
which would allow the secretary to exercise some 
unusual authority, he must show that he has actually 
read the articles in question: Rama's case. 
As with the other forms of authority, none can exist 
if it is prohibited by the memorandum or articles of 
association. 
In both cases of holding out whether it is of 
usual or unusual powers, the holding out must be done 
by someone having actual authority to make the 
representation - see Freeman's case. 
Forgery 
The general rule is that, should a company 
represent that a document is genuine, it will be 
estopped from afterwards denying such representation. ' 
The difficulty is to determine when such a representation 
can be made by a secretary so as to bind the company. 
In examining this question, one must distinguish between 
the two types of forgery which may be involved - that 
which consists of the counterfeiting of another's signature, 
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and that which involves signing without authority -
see Campbell (1960) 76 L.Q.R. 1)0. In the first type 
of forgery, the rule is that such forgery does not bind 
the company unless warranted genuine by some official 
acting within his authority. In the second type of 
forgery the company will ·be bound if the act is 
done by the secretary acting with authority. In Ruben 
v. Great Fingall Consolidated (1906) A.C. 439, where 
a company secretary had issued a share certificate to 
which he had affixed the company's seal and forged 
the signatures of the directores in whose presence 
it purported to ·be affixed, it was held that the 
document was a forgery and that therefore it could 
not bind the company unless some official acting 
within his authority had warranted that it was 
genuine. It was there held that a secretary had no 
such authority, either actual or ostensible. However, 
it was also stated that, whatever his authority, it 
could not apply to a forgery, but only to a genuine 
document. As later explained in Slingsby v. District ~ (1931) 2 K.B. 588. 
"••• an act of forgery is a nullity and outside any actual or ostensible authority." 
In these cases, however, the forgery involved was 
that of counterfeiting and therefore did not involve 
any agency relationship. Where the forgery is the 
other type, i.e. a representation by the secretary 
that he has authority to bind the company, an agency 
relationship does exist, and no question of nullity 
need be involved. Here the effect of the forgery 
upon the company will depend upon the authority 
possessed by the secretary. As we saw in relation 
to the certification of share transfers under s.89, 
the secretary's actual and ostensible authority in 
this area is very limited. However within those 
limits, the rule is that the company will be estopped 
if the forgery is put forward by an officer who is 
acting with actual, usual, or ostensible authority. 
In that case it does not matter that the officer is 
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acting fraudulently - see Uxbridge Permanent Building ~ v. Pickard (1939) 2 K.B. 248. 
Narrow View 
Most of the disputes which have raged in this 
area of company law have centred on this question of 
the precise authority of the secretary to "bind the 
company. As we noted, the courts early adopted a 
very narrow view of the secretary's powers. 
This was at a time when the role of secretary was 
in its infancy and was still developing. It goes 
without saying that the importance of the position 
then would be nothing like it is today. But still 
one gets the impression from the cases, that even 
in those early days, the practice in the commercial 
world was to treat the position as one of some and 
importance," the secretary as a person having fairly 
wide powers. Indeed it was this readiness of 
business people to treat the secretary as such 
that led to the numerous disputes which in those 
days existed in this area. At the same time, one 
could see the danger that existed from allowing 
unduly wide powers to an agent, for as said in a 
later case with regard to a bill of exchange, 
"••• that would be a most alarming doctrine for companies, for any one who has the pen of a ready writer need only sit down and write a bill of exchange in the name of a company." 
see- Kreditbank Cassel v. Schenkers Ltd (1927) 1 K.B. 826. 
In that case a branch manager drew bills in the name 
of the defendant company. It was held that as the 
·branch manager had no authority, the company was not 
bound. The courts were conscious of the vulnerability 
of companies for the acts of their agents, and tended 
to protect the companies by severely curtailing the 
usual and ostensible powers of these agents. This 
they did, in the case of the secretary, by reducing his 
status to that of the most menial servant. 
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A typical example of the narrow views of these early 
judges of the secretary's powers were those of Martin B. 
who in Williams v. Chester and Holyhead Railway Co, 
in 1851 placed him below a managing clerk, referring to 
him in these terms: 
"The secretary of a railway company is in a 
very different position from that of a managing clerk of a private company or firm; he is the 
secretary only; and unless his act is 
authorised by the directors or the committee, 
it is not in our opinion binding on the 
corporation or company". 
Not only could he not bind the company, but he could 
not even speak for it. Thus in Rennie v. Wynn (1849) 
4 Exch. 691, where the secretary purported to write on 
behalf of the company to the plaintiff advising him 
that he had been appointed engineer, the court refused 
to allow the letter to be tendered in evidence against 
the company. The court held not only that the 
secretary had no general power to appoint anyone, but 
also that he had no power to make communications to bind 
the company. Another case was In re Royal British Bank 
ex parte Frowd (1861) 30 L.J. Ch. 322. That case 
concerned a clerk,but the principle would apply equally 
to a secretary. There the clerk by fraudulent 
representation induced Frowd to invest in the company. 
Frowd took shares, became liable on them, and sought 
to rescind the contract on the ground of fraud. The 
principle was that such rescission was available if 
the purchase had been induced by the representations 
of the company, but not if the representations had been 
made by someone else. It ·became necessary therefore 
for Frowd to show that the representations of the clerk 
were the representations of the company. The judge 
held that they were not, adding that it never occurred 
to him that the representation of a clerk or manager 
or director were the representations of the company. 
We see the same restrictive view of the secretary's 
powers to make representations on behalf of the 
company in Newland's case. There are many other 
similar cases where the courts refused to treat the 
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acts, representations, or utterances of the secretary 
as binding on the company. 
Basis of Narrow View 
All these cases are explicable in terms of the 
ideas of the times which were acting on the minds of 
the judges. These ideas were related not so much to 
the evidence of business practice, for none seems to 
have been placed before the courts, as to erroneous 
legal doctrines which were prevalent at the time 
in the company and principal-agent areas and which 
influenced the minds of the judges. One learned 
writer, Lindgren, writing in 46 A.L.J. 185, has referred 
to these early ideas and their influence on the 
powers of the agent to bind his principal, first as 
a natural person, and second as a corporation. The 
effect of these influences was to restrict the agent's 
powers and although most of the cases dealt with agents 
other than secretaries, so long as the secretary's 
powers continued to be examined in the context of 
principal and agent, any reduction in any agent's 
powers generally, reduced the secretary's power in 
a similar way. 
There were many of these false notions abroad, 
and although some were more influential than others, 
all to a greater or less degree played a part in 
restricting the secretary's powers. One particularly 
influential one was the rule, stated for example, by 
Willes J. in Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank (1867) 
L.R. 2 Ex. 259, that an agent could not bind his 
principal when acting otherwise than for the principal's 
benefit~ This restrictive rule of an agent's powers 
was applied in Whitechurch Ltd v. Cavanagh (1902) A.C. 117. 
It was again applied to the secretary situation in Ruben 
v. Great Fingall Consolidated (1906) A.C. 439. This 
particular rule was exposed and discredited in Lloyd v. 
Grace Smith and Co, (1912) A.C. 716, but up till then it had 
a very wide and important influence in restrictively fixing 
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the secretary's powers. Indeed, so strongly ingrained 
in the courts' thinking had the notion become that even 
after Lloyd's case its influence remained. See Kleinwort's case. 
Another early influence was the doctrine that no 
fraudulent representation of the secretary could bind 
the company unless it was done under the authority and 
direction of the board of directors in the sense that 
the agent was acting directly for the principal. As 
stated by Lord Esher M.R. in British Mutual Banking Co, 
v. Charnwood Forest Railway Co. (1887} 18 Q.B.D. 714, 
at p.717 -
"This (the rule that to bind the principal the agent must be acting for the benefit of the principal) ••• is equivalent to saying that he must be acting for the principal, since if there is authority to do the act it does not matter if the principal is benefited by it." 
Yet another false notion which intruded into the 
principal-agent area to limit the authority of the 
secretary was that there could be no liability for 
careless though innocent words, which was first 
established in Derry v • ..f.w (1889) 14 App, Cas. 337. 
We see the intrusion of this doctrine in Bishop v. 
Balkis Consolidated Co, (1890) 25 Q.B.D, 512, This 
doctrine was not finally dispelled until the Hedley 
Byrne case in 1964. 
The result of some of these early influences is 
apparent in Newlands case. Although it was there 
argued that a secretary was a person authorised to 
make communications about the company to persons 
desiring to enter into relations with the company, 
the court would have none of it, but preferred to 
adopt the traditional view of the secretary's 
role. The result was that his authority was 
reduced virtually to vanishing point. As stated 
by Brett M.R. -
JS. 
"A secretary is a mere servant, his position is that he is to do what he is told, and no person can assume that he has any authority to represent anything at all ••• " 
Perhaps on its particular facts this judgment 
can be justified - the contract had been in existence 
for two years, and the company had presumably benefited 
from it. But the trouble was that the limitation of 
the secretary's authority stated so narrowly in that 
case was treated as a universal truth and applied to 
cases where the facts were quite different. The 
most striking of these was perhaps Barnett's case. 
In that case a company was held not bound by its 
secretary's representation as to the amount of 
retention money owed by the company to its contractors, 
on the faith of which the plaintiff lent money to case them. This was not an agency/at all, for there 
the inquirer simply wanted the information contained 
in the company's records to use for his own purposes. 
It was therefore far less appropriate there than in 
Newlands' case to examine the question of the secretary's 
authority to speak for the company in terms of agency 
principles. As argued before the court, "it is part 
of the ordinary business of a company that such 
inquiries as were made by the plaintiffs should be 
addressed to it with relation to financial matters in 
which it is interested. The proper person to whom they 
must necessarily be addressed on behalf of the company 
is its secretary. It is necessarily, therefore, within 
the scope of his employment as secretary to answer such 
inquiries". This would seem to be the proper way in 
which to have examined the function of the secretary 
in that particular case, that is to say, in terms of 
his right to act as the natural mouthpiece of the company. 
However, that was not to be - the court neither listened 
to these arguments nor even called on the defendant to 
answer them; it simply applied the strict agency 
principles which were current. As Lord Esher M.R. put 
it:" I am content to give my judgment in the same terms 
as I employed in Newlands case." Barnett's case was 
approved by the House of Lords in George Whitechurch Ltd v. 
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Cavanagh (1902) A.C. 117, and again in Ruben's case. 
These early doctrines, and other besides referred 
to 'by Lindgren, such as those peculiar to the company 
area, that a body corporate lacked capacity to commit 
and therefore to be answerable for a tort or crime, 
or that a body corporate could not be liable for a 
tort in which a distinctly human feeling or motive 
was an element, all had a restricting influence on 
the extent of the powers accorded by the courts to a 
company or its agent and thus to a secretary. Although 
the notions which bred these restrictive attitudes 
were later discarded as false, nevertheless the 
current of the law was thus early set on its 
erroneous course, and having been so set, even 
though the course may have been seen later to have 
been a false one, it tended to become fixed so that 
the principles governing the powers of the secretary 
came by and large to be treated as final and immutable. 
As noted by some writers (e.g. Lindgren op.cit.; 
Telfer (1973) Kingston Law Review), a feature of 
these decisions on the scope of a secretary's 
authority has been the tendency for the courts to base 
their decisions not on facts placed before them of 
what commercial practice is, but on the "general 
knowledge of business which is attributed to the 
court'', per Brett M.R. in Newlands' case. In that 
sense the scope of the secretary's usual authority 
became to be almost a rule of law. 
This narrow view was followed and applied without 
question by later judges - see, for example, Daimler Co 
v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co, (1916) 2 A.C. 307, 
where a secretary was held not to have the power to 
institute legal proceedings; Houghton and Co, v. 
Nothard Lowe and Wills (1928) A.C. 1, where the confirmation 
by the secretary, acting without authority, of an unusual 
contract was held not to be binding on the company; and 
Re Cleadon's Trust (1939) Ch. 286, where it was held 
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that the secretary has no power to borrow money on 
behalf of the company. Although, on the facts, these 
decisions may perhaps be justified, the judgments are 
redolent of the narrow views of the status of the 
secretary as expressed by the judges of an earlier 
age. Note, for example, these words by Viscount 
Dunedin in Houghton's case at p.11 -
"The arrangement is of such a character as to be quite beyond the power of a secretary to impose on the company ••• " 
Or again at the same page -
"The knowledge of a mere official like the 
secretary would only be the knowledge of 
the company if the thing of which knowledge is predicted was a thing within the ordinary domain of the secretary's duties." 
Or as Viscount Sumner put it at p.18 -
"The mind, so to speak, of a company 
is not reached or affected by information 
merely possessed by its clerks" 
Yet secretaries in practice continued to exercise 
wide powers, and the trend of the business world was to 
increase their powers. The legislature too were 
beginning to recognise the secretary's growing 
importance. Textbook writers without exception 
pointed to the complete divergence of the judicial 
view from these practices. But the courts persisted 
in holding, based on their antiquated ideas of business 
practice, that the secretary had no power beyond that 
of a servant of humble character. As one commentator 
(Collier 1972A C.L.J. 44) says, one would almost 
expect to find, on opening the door of the company's 
office, Uriah Heep engaged in licking stamps and 
blotting copybooks. It was not until the Panorama 
case in 1971 that a change came. 
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The Panorama case 
That was a case where the secretary of a company 
entered into a contract for the hire of cars on behalf 
of and in the name of the company. The company denied 
liability on the ground that the secretary had no 
authority to bind it in contract. The argument 
proceeded along the usual lines - that the secretary 
had no express authority and so lacked actual authority; 
that therefore the only authority the secretary could 
claim would be that which the company held him out as 
possessing; that the company made no representation 
other than that implied by its appointment of him as 
its secretary; but that such representation served 
only as a representation that the secretary had the 
usual powers of a secretary, and such usual powers 
were very limited and certainly did not involve the 
power to enter into contracts on behalf of the company 
for the hire of cars. In support of this argument 
the co~pany was able to invoke a wealth of authority 
going back to Barnett's case and beyond which held 
that a secretary was a mere servant whose position 
was that he was to do as he was told, and that no 
person could assume that he had any authority to 
represent anything at all. As we saw, the result of 
this traditional judicial attitude was to reduce the 
secretary's usual powers virtually to nothing, which 
meant that no one dealing with him could without 
specific confirmation treat him as having any 
authority to do, almost, anything. Not only was 
this view onerous and unfair to persons dealing 
with the company, but it was out of touch with the 
realities of commercial practice. But it was of long 
standing and had twice been approved by the House of 
Lords. It had been applied throughout the Commonwealth 
and continued to be so applied, even as late as 1966 
in Donato's case where it was expressly held that a 
secretary's general authority did not extend into 
the fields of contract or representation. Therefore 
any change in judicial thinking was not considered to 
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·be very likely. However the court, conscious apparently 
at long last of the utter unreality of the traditional 
judicial viewpoint, refused to follow it, preferring 
instead to follow the example of commercial practice 
and of legislative policy which for long had accorded 
to the company secretary an importance and status 
commensurate with his position and responsibilities 
as the chief administrative officer of the company. 
As Lord Denning said at p.19 -
"But times have changed. A company secretary is a much more important person nowadays than he was in 1887. He is an officer of the company with extensive duties and responsibilities". 
Salmon L.J. spoke in a similar vein when at p.19 he 
said -
"I think there can be no doubt that the secretary is the chief administrative officer of the company." 
Both judges spoke of the authority possessed by the 
secretary as falling within his "ostensible" authority. 
As Collier (op.cit,) points out, this seems to be an 
infelicious way of putting it. As we saw earlier in 
Hely-Hutchinson's case, Lord Denning distinguished 
clearly between actual implied authority and ostensible 
authority. Of course, as Lord Denning explained, implied 
and ostensible authority often amount to the same thing, 
at any rate from the point of view of outsiders, so 
that the question of whether it is the one or the other 
will not matter, as it did not in the present case. But 
it might, if, for example, the other party to the 
transaction is not really an outsider but an "insider" 
as in Morris v. Kanssen (1946) AcC. 359. As Collier 
says, it might be conducive to greater clarity and 
understanding if the words "ostensible" or "apparent" 
were to be used only in the sense of non-actual 
authority. In Panorama's case it would seem that the 
secretary, having ·been duly appointed as such, had 
actual implied authority and not merely ostensible authority. 
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In their departure from precedent the judges paid 
scant regard to the niceties of stare decisis, for instead 
of the traditional attempt to justify their departure by 
an elaborate process of distinguishing the earlier cases, 
they simply treated them as being no longer valid. So 
much for the law that had stood for over 90 years. Although 
the change of view was prompted by changed circumstances 
rather than any overturning of principles, nevertheless 
again there was no attempt to base the decision on any 
broad empirical study of the particular facts of the 
company in question, but to state the secretary's 
authority more in terms of a rule of law, e.g. as a 
power "to sign contracts connected with the administrative 
side of the company's affairs." But as Telfer, op.cit. 
points out, the significance of each company secretary 
in his particular company will vary - in some he is the 
principal executive figure, in others he deals simply 
with the clerical duties associated with the board of 
directors and the Companies Office. No broad rule of 
law can cover all these differences. 
There was however no complete abandonment of the 
old law. The secretary's enlarged powers were confined 
to administrative matters only and were not to be 
allowed to encroach on managerial functions. 
Salmon L.J. said at p.19 -
Thus 
"Whether the secretary would have any authority to sign a contract relating to the commercial management of the company, for example, a contract for the sale or purchase of goods in which the company deals does not arise for decision in the present case and I do not propose to express any concluded opinion on the point." 
The difficulty however is to know in the marginal 
case just where the boundary between the administrative and 
managerial functions is to be drawn. The purchase of 
cloth by a clothing manufacturer as in the case before 
the court was clearly considered to be managerial and 
thus outside the secretary's usual function. Therefore 
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the law as was laid down as far back as 1851 in Williams' 
case in the case of the purchase of boiler plates remains 
unchanged. Similarly the secretary would lack ostensible 
authority in such as case as Houghton's case, where he 
sought to confirm an unusual contract, or in Re Cleadon's 
Trust where he purported to borrow money on ·behalf of 
the company. Again probably he has no authority to 
warrant the genuineness of a forged share certificate 
as in Ru·ben's case. Nor, although he will have 
authority to give a receipt for a share certificate, 
will such authority extend to the certification of a 
share transfer when no certificate has been lodged, 
as in the Whitechurch and Kleinwort cases. As we saw, 
s.89 is applicable only in those cases where there has 
·been company authorisation. But on the other hand, the 
common task of certificating share transfers is so 
much part of the secretary's routine administrative 
function as necessarily to fall within the administrative 
functions referred to by the judges in Panorama's case. 
On the same reasoning, it could be said that the secretary 
should no longer lack authority to perform such 
administrative tasks as calling a meeting or registering 
share transfers, and that cases like Chida's case may 
therefore no longer be authoritative. 
The hiring of cars in circumstances such as those 
which existed in the Panorama case would be treated as 
administrative and thus within the usual authority of the 
secretary. It would also cover such matters as the engaging 
of staff. Presumably also covered would be the act of 
supplying information in answer to an inquiry by a prospective 
lender regarding the amount of retention money held by the 
company to the account of the prospective borrower, as in 
Barnett's case, although the making of representations • 
as to the company's affairs in order to induce people to 
take shares in the company as in Newlands' case would probably 
not be. 
p 
~ 
0 
l _, 
..-t-
~ 
Therefore, although it is clear that the company 
secretary now has as part of his usual powers the 
authority to bind the company in administrative 
matters relating to the day-to-day affairs of the 
company, what is still not clear is how far those 
powers are to extend. In re Maidstone, Pennycuick v.c. 
made it clear that the area was to be limited rather 
than extensive, and that it was no part of the 
secretary's function to concern himself with the 
management of the business. He states the position 
at p.J68 thus -
"So far as the position of a secretary as such 
is concerned, it is established beyond all 
question that a secretary, while merely 
performing the duties appropriate to the office 
of secretary, is not concerned in the management 
in the company." 
According to one commentator (Bastin (1971) The 
Law Teacher 174) the authority of the company 
secretary to bind the company by contract or to 
make representations as to the company's affairs 
may. following Panorama's case, be summarised in these 
termsr 
(1) If it can be shown that the secretary has express 
authority, any transaction within the scope of that 
authority will be binding on the company; 
(2) If the transaction can properly be regarded as 
relating to administration, then this will be covered 
by the ostensible (i . e . usual) authority of the 
secretary and the company will be bound unless it can 
be shown that the party attempting to rely on this 
authority was aware of any restrictions that may have 
been placed on it; 
(J) If the transaction is other than an administrative 
one, then the company will not be bound unless the 
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secretary has been held out as having authority to enter 
this particular type of transaction by the organ of the 
company with actual authority. 
Liabilities 
A secretary who seeks to bind his company in contract 
or 'by a representation to a third party, represents that 
he is the agent of the company and that he has the 
authority of the company as his principal so to bind. 
Where his authority is lacking so that the company is 
not ·bound, the third party will have a remedy against the 
agent. 
Deceit 
If the agent knows that he possesses no authority 
to act as agent, but nevertheless makes a representation 
to the contrary and in consequence causes loss to the 
party with whom he contracts or to whom he makes the 
representation, he may be sued in tort by that party 
for deceit: Polhill v. Walter (1832) 3 B. and Ad. 114. 
Breach of Warranty of Authority 
If on the other hand, the agent mistakenly though 
innocently believes that he possesses authority, he 
cannot be lia'ble in tort for deceit. However the courts 
have held that the agent must be deemed in such a case 
to have implicitly warranted the truth of his assertion 
that the necessary authority existed and therefore in 
acting without such authority he was in breach of that 
implied warranty, and that for such breach the third 
party has a remedy: Collen v. Wright (1857) 8 E. and B. 647. 
The remedy has come to be known as an action for the 
breach of an implied warranty of authority. 
In the case of a secretary acting as the agent for a 
company it must be remembered that, as pointed out 
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earlier, persons dealing with the company are deemed to 
have notice of its memorandum and articles and so of any 
lack of authority in the secretary as disclosed on that 
record. As we saw this knowledge does not go however 
to matters of indoor management. The distinction made 
by the courts is that between misrepresentation of fact, 
in which case the agent will be liable, and of law, in 
which case he will not. The position regarding the 
application of this doctrine in the company area has 
·been stated by Street, Ultra Vires, 314, in these words: 
"The true position perhaps is that an outsider, 
being taken to know the contents of statutes 
and other public documents, cannot complain of 
any statement as to powers, the correctness of 
which he can estimate by reference thereto. 
But if he is misled by statements affecting the 
operation of such documents, so that knowledge of 
the law will not help him, then the maker of 
such statements will be liable on a warranty of 
authority." 
Secretary as mouthpiece 
Up till now, in considering the company's relations 
with outsiders, we have seen the secretary in the role 
of an agent, with his powers (and liabilities) 
dependent upon an authority derived from the company 
as his principal, We now leave that idea, to consider 
an alternative possibility, that of treating the 
authority of the secretary as deriving not from any 
principal-agent relationship existing between him and 
the company but as attaching to the position itself 
as a function of that position. He would be seen as 
the organ of communication to speak for the company. 
As we saw, this way of looking at his function had been 
suggested in argument in earlier cases, e.g. Barnett's 
case, but was not accepted. It had been applied in 
some earlier cases, as for example in 1h!.§.h v. Weiss 
(1846) 8 L.T. (o.s.) 137, where letters by the 
secretary stating that certain work had been done were 
readily admitted in evidence as an admission of that 
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fact. Again a somewhat similar attitude was adopted 
towards the secretary's role in Reuter v, Electric 
Telegraph Co, (1856) 119 E.R. 892. The role of the 
secretary to act as the mouthpiece of the company 
was denied however in Bruff v. Great Northern Railway 
Co. (1858) 175 E.R. 757, and also in Harris v. MacQuarrie 
Distributors Pty Ltd (1967) V.R. 257, All these cases 
were ones where the secretary's act was not intended 
to bind the company in any contractual sense but 
merely to speak for it, but in the main the courts 
tended to treat his power as deriving from the agency 
relationship. A different approach was adopted 
however in one recent case, that of Donato v, Legi on 
~ (1966) 2 N.S.W,R. 583. That case concerned 
the publication of a libel by the secretary acting 
on behalf of the company, and it was held that by 
reason of his appointment alone and quite apart from 
any authority derived by him as an agent, he had the 
necessary authority to publish on behalf of the 
company so as to bind it, As stated by Wallace, P. 
at p, 588 
"The secretary of an incorporated legal entity is 
its natural mouthpiece and may be understood as 
having a very general authority on ordinary 
matters relating to the company's affairs and 
administration though not usually of course in 
such fields as those of contract or representation," 
This view seems, with respect, to be an eminently 
sensible one. We noted earlier, when examining the 
secretary's statutory duties, the requirement of the 
Act that a secretary be appointed, and the wide 
range of statutory duties which fell within the 
area of his respons~bility - the keeping of the share 
register, the preparation and filing of returns, the 
keeping of records, and so on, all of which gave him 
an intimate knowledge of the day-to-day state of the 
company's operations. We noted also, when examining 
his duties and functions towards the company itself, 
that he was primarily responsible for the internal 
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running of the company, Finally we saw that his role 
was recognised in Panorama's case as that of the 
chief administrative officer, It follows that, as the 
person so intimately involved with the internal 
affairs of the company, he should be the one both to 
receive communications and to speak for the company 
on all matters falling within those areas, 
Tort -
The circumstances under which the secretary can bind 
the company in tort are very wide. Here again it is 
usually based on agency principles. The general rule 
is that a company is liable to be sued for any tort 
committed by its agent if an action would lie against 
the agent and he is acting in the course of his 
employment or within the scope of his ostensible 
authority and the act complained of is one which the 
company might possibly be authorised by its constitution 
to commit. The secretary is of course himself also 
liable - Dimond's case, 
Crime 
In the case of offences for which there is liability 
without fault, the company is lia.ble vicariously for 
the acts of its secretary done in the course of his 
employment. Where proof of mens rea is necessary, only 
the person who actually commits the offence is liable, 
Therefore, in such a case, it is only where the secretary 
can be said to be acting as the company that the 
company will be liable for his act. Normally to be so 
acting he must represent the directing mind and will of 
the company and control what it does: Tesco's case. This 
implies a good deal more participation in the ma nagement 
of the company than was conceded to the secretary, even 
in the Panorama case, for to be part of the directing 
mind and will of the company requires that the participant 
be part of the management. It seems however that in the 
50. 
area of a company's activities which is covered by the 
criminal law, the secretary, whether as an officer or 
as the secretary, is considered to have large powers 
of management - see Registrar of Trading v. W.H. Smith 
(1969) 3 All E.R. 1065, where the secretary was included 
among those who manage the company's affairs. Lord 
Denning stated the position at p.1069 thus -
"Officer may include, of course, a person who is 
not a manager. It includes a secretary. It would 
also include an auditor, and so~e others. But the 
relevant officer here is an officer who is a 
manager. In this context it means a person who 
is managing in a governing role the affairs of the 
company itself." 
A similar view was taken of the secretary's status 
in Tesco's case, where all the law lords accepted that 
the reason the secretary was named in the statute 
which they were there considering was that he typified 
the person who may personify the directing mind and will 
of the company. See also Meulen's case, where knowledge 
of the secretary was imputed to the company. The reason 
for this upgrading of the secretary's status is of course 
the courts' strong desire to fix liability on the company, 
and their need therefore, should the act be done by the 
secretary, to identify him with the company. 
In Re Maidstone however, a more restrictive view was 
taken, for there as we saw it was held that a secretary 
in performing the duties appropriate to the office of 
secretary is not concerned in carrying on the business of 
the company, and could not, therefore, be held liable as 
a party to fraudulent trading by the company under s.320 
of the Companies Act . Thus the wide view of the 
secretary's status invoked to extend liability to his 
company, is not adopted in the converse case to extend 
the company's liability to him. 
51. 
Conclusions 
We see then that the commercial world has from 
earliest times tended to accord to the secretary a 
position of importance, both within the company and 
towards outsiders, and that as time has gone on that 
tendency has continued. We noted the views of 
textbook writers which confirmed this trend. Especially 
important in this trend was, as we saw, the policies 
of the professional body of chartered secretaries, 
aimed at the upgrading of the secretarial skills of 
their members and so fitting the~ to uncertake a 
wider range of activities and to give more skilled 
advice to their directors. All these factors go to 
show a growth in the status and importance of the 
secretary. One writer (Lindgren in 1974 Business 
L.R. 288) conducted a survey of a number of companies 
with regard to their contracting practices, and 
although not conclusive on many aspects of the 
inquiry, it did at least confirm the fact of the 
great importance of the secretary in the conduct of 
the affairs of most companies. We noted the gradual 
recognition and upgrading of the company secretary 
by the legislature through its policy of increasing 
the secretary's statutory functions and duties, 
and ·by requiring his appointment. But these statutory 
provisions are very limited, being confined to matters 
which are purely routine and ministerial. The 
legislature has therefore not moved far enough and 
there~ still a considerable divergence between its 
recognition and that of the commercial world of the 
status and importance of the company secretary. As 
regards the courts, we saw how in the early history 
of the company secretary, they adopted a narrow view 
of his powers, a view which even then was behind that 
of commercial practice. But the courts persisted 
with the view, so that the divergence widened. It 
was not until Panorama's case that many of the old 
restrictions were cast off. However the full extent 
of the new freedom is not yet clear, for the 
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secretary's authority being based still on agency 
principles, it does seem that there will be a good 
deal of activity which must inevitably remain 
excluded from the scope of that authority. Thus 
those managerial functions which, as Lindgren's 
researches show, fall so naturally within the 
sphere of the secretary's operations, being 
managerial, are under agency principles excluded. 
Thus the divergence between the judicial and 
co~mercial world re~ains. We noted a possible 
alternative approach that of the organic rather 
than the agency concept, adopted in Donato's 
case. So far however this is limited to fields 
outside representations and contracts. 
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